Abstract: This paper first examines outside block-holders' impact on earnings management using discretionary accounting accruals as the measure of earnings management. For the income-decreasing earnings management scenario, we do not find significant results. This may be attributable to the different natures and time horizons of outside block-holders. Since the majority of outside block-holders are institutional investors, we then investigate the relationship between ownership by institutional investors with different natures and earnings management. Specifically, we find a significant positive relationship between ownership by transient institutional investors (holding diversified portfolios with high turnover) and discretionary accounting accruals. We also find a negative relationship (not significant) between ownership by dedicated institutional investors (holding concentrated portfolios with low turnover) and discretionary accounting accruals. Therefore, due to the differing natures of outside block-holders (e.g.: institutional investors), we may not treat them as a homogeneous group.
Introduction
Outside block-holders, who beneficially own at least 5 percent of a firm's outstanding common stocks but do not serve as executive officers or directors, are an important external mechanism which governs managers. Because of this importance to managers, two competing views have emerged with regard to the association between outside block-holders and earnings management. One view notes that outside block-holders have more incentives to monitor managers because monitoring is more cost-efficient for outside block-holders as compared to the smaller shareholders. This higher incentive of outside block-holders in monitoring managers' actions potentially reduces earnings management by restricting managers' discretion with financial reporting. A second view notes that outside block-holders exert more pressure on managers to report favorable financial performance than do small shareholders. Therefore, the stronger the existence of outside block-holders, the more likely it may be to create extra pressure for those firms' managers to engage in income-increasing earnings management.
To investigate these potential relationships, we obtain data on outside block-holders from Gompers et al. at WRDS. and use discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management. The data was cleaned from possible biases and errors observed for this type of data. Block-holders' data is reported by the firm for the period 1996-2001 and contains standardized data for block-holders of 1,913 companies. Within this data set, we do not find significant results when examining the relationship between outside block-holders and earnings management in the income-decreasing earnings management scenario. This result urges a re-examination of the different natures of outside block-holders.
Institutional investors represent the majority of outside block-holders. In recent years, there has been an increasing focus on the role of institutional investors in monitoring, disciplining and influencing corporate managers. Some studies find that institutional investors have a degree of effectiveness in forcing managers to focus on economic performance and to refrain from opportunistic self-serving behavior (e.g. Smith, 1996, Del Guercio and Hawkins, 1999) . There is, however, some research which finds that institutional investors are fixated on short-term performance --even to the detriment of the long-term prosperity of the firm (e.g. Demirag, 1998) . These conflicting results may be partially due to the different natures of institutional investors under different study settings. Based on past investment behavior, Bushee (1998) classifies institutional investors into three categories: transient institutional investors who hold diversified portfolios with high turnover; dedicated institutional investors who hold concentrated portfolios with low turnover; and quasi-indexers who hold diversified portfolios with low turnover. Bushee (1998) investors. Specifically, we find a significant positive relationship between transient institutional investors (holding diversified portfolios with high turnover) and discretionary accounting accruals. We find a negative relationship between dedicated institutional investors (holding concentrated portfolios with low turnover) and discretionary accounting accruals. This research differs from prior studies in several aspects. First, the results are in contrast with previous conclusions regarding the effect of institutional ownership on earnings management. Rajgopal, Jiambalvo, and Venkatachalam (2002) and Shang (2003) find that institutional ownership is associated with reduced use of discretionary accruals. However, they do not distinguish between various institutional investment horizons, treating all institutional investors as a homogeneous group. We find the negative correlation between institutional ownership and accruals manipulation is driven entirely by dedicated institutions and quasi-indexers. Ownership by transient institutional investors is actually positively related to the use of accruals manipulation.
Second, prior studies used a balance-sheet-based accrual approach as a proxy for total accruals when examining the impact of institutional investors on earnings management. Chung, Firth and Kim (2002) define total accruals as the change in non-cash current assets minus change in current liabilities minus depreciation and amortization expenses. However, we calculate total accruals directly from the statement of cash flows as suggested by Collins and Hribar (2002) , which is now the current method in more recent research.
Third, prior studies examine how institutional investors affect the incidence of R&D deductions (Bushee 1998), meeting or exceeding expectations (Matsumoto 2002) , and accounting restatements (Liu 2006). Since they focus on firms which are more likely to take actions to avoid negative earnings news (some special scenarios), their samples are not representative of the spectrum of earnings management. This paper presents a broader view of the impact of institutional investors on earnings management.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: In section 2 we briefly review the earnings management literature and the role of outside block-holders in monitoring earnings management. We also develop the idea that institutional investors with different natures will have different impacts on earnings management. The sample selection and research design are introduced in Section 3. Section 4 presents empirical results and additional tests. Conclusions are presented in Section 5. Schipper (1989) provides the following definition of earnings management: "Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some shareholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers."
Incentives for engaging in and monitoring earnings management

Mangers' incentives to engage in earnings management
As Schipper notes, earnings management includes accrual-based and real earnings management, such as changes in accounting principals and estimates, investments, and financing decisions. There are respective benefits and costs associated with accrual manipulation and real decision manipulation. For accrual manipulation, the benefit is that accruals are not easy to detect and there is flexibility in manipulating accruals. The cost is that accruals will reverse in the following period, perhaps even 100%, and there may not be enough accruals to manipulate. The benefit of real decision manipulation is that it is difficult to identify. The cost is that it has the potential for high future loss to the firm's value. This paper examines managers' opportunistic behavior of manipulating discretionary accruals, rather than real activities. The incentives for managers to manipulate discretionary accruals could stem from their compensation contract, given that accounting numbers, including earnings, are often used in setting executive compensation. The incentives could also come from the valuation of IPOs, management buyouts and debt covenants. Empirical research has investigated whether there is an evidence of earnings management in the presence of those situations, and, many studies find that corporate managers opportunistically manage reported earnings.
(e.g.: Teoh et al., 1997; Rangan, 1998) .
The role of outside block-holders in monitoring managers
With regard to the association between outside block-holders and earnings management, there are two competing views. One view is that outside block-holders have more incentives to monitor the actions of managers than do small outside shareholders because monitoring is more cost-efficient for outside block-holders.
Small outside shareholders can sell their stocks quickly if they are not satisfied with the performance of managers. However, selling a large block of stocks often triggers the stock price to plunge. Outside block-holders generally have to adopt a relatively long-term strategy. Consequently, the monitoring of managers produces more benefits for outside block-holders than for outside small shareholders. The higher incentive of outside block-holders in monitoring managers' actions potentially reduces earnings management by restricting managers' discretion with financial reporting.
A second view proposes that outside block-holders exert more pressure on managers to report favorable financial performance than do small shareholders.
Block-holders could pressure managers to take specific actions or call for dismissal of the managers whenever the company appears to be performing below its potential.
Therefore, the existence of outside block-holders in this view actually creates extra pressure for those firms' managers to engage in income-increasing earnings management. The two competing views are not mutually exclusive since the question of how outside block-holders affect earnings management depends on which of the two conflicting factors would dominate. This determination is made after reviewing the costs and benefits of the earnings management to outside block-holders.
The role of institutional investors in monitoring managers
Institutional investors represent the majority of outside block-holders. Based on past investment behavior, Bushee (1998) 
Managerial share ownership
Managerial ownership could have an impact on the use of discretionary accruals. Warfield et al. (1995) find (1) 
Research design
Measure of total accruals and discretionary accruals
The traditional approach to calculate total accruals is as follows:
where the change (Δ) is the difference between years t and t-1.
However, this balance-sheet-based approach has been questioned by Collins and Hribar (2000) . They measure accruals using the changes in the current accounts disclosed on the SFAS 95 (FASB, 1987) statement of cash flow from operations.
Collins and Hribar (2000) document that the approaches taken to estimate accruals as the difference in succeeding balance sheet amounts induces measurement error due to the failure to adjust for merger/acquisition and divestiture activity. They further document that if partitioning variables used to indicate the presence of earnings management is correlated with variables related to merger/acquisition or divestiture activity, the measurement error in discretionary accrual estimates could lead the researcher to conclude that earnings management exists when there is, in fact, none.
The manner in which Collins and Hribar (2000) measure discretionary accruals has been widely used in recent studies (Xie 2001; Fan and Qintao 2007) . Thus, following the current literature, we calculate total accruals directly from the statement of cash flows as suggested by Collins and Hribar (2002):
where: EBXI = earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations CFO = cash flow from continuing operations.
Using the modified Jones model, we estimate total accruals as a function of changes in sales revenues minus changes in account receivables, property, plant, and equipment. Formally:
Where, for firm i in year t: TAC i,,t has been defined in Eq. (2) T.A. i,t-1 = lagged total assets Δ REV i,t = change in sales revenue ΔAR i,t = change in accounts receivables PPE i,,t = property, plant and equipment
For each year and industry (based on two-digit SIC codes), we estimate regression parameters in Eq (3) using cross-sectional observations. Nondiscretionary accruals are defined as the fitted value from Eq. (3). Discretionary accruals (DAC) are estimated as the difference between total accruals (TAC) and its fitted value, i.e. the residual from Eq. (3). Consistent with accounting literature, DAC is assumed to be the outcome of managers' opportunistic choices of discretionary accruals.
Measures of outside block-holders ownership and institutional ownership
Outside block-holders ownership data is obtained from the database provided by Gompers et al. at WRDS. The data was cleaned from biases and errors observed in sources for this type of data. Block-holders' data is reported by the firm for the period 1996-2001 and contains standardized data for block-holders of 1,913 companies.
For institutional ownership, the data is obtained from CDA spectrum (Thomson Financial), which contains the institutional ownership data from the SEC's form 13(f).
At the end of each calendar quarter, any institutional investors with greater than $100 million in equity securities must file Form 13(f), which discloses their common stock holdings of greater than 10,000 shares or $200,000. We averaged the quarterly holdings of outstanding shares owned by institutional investors to calculate the annual institutional ownership. We then identified transient institutional ownership, dedicated institutional ownership and quasi-indexing institutional ownership according to institutional classification by Bushee (2001) 1 . The classification is performed using factor and cluster analysis on institutional investor' past investment behavior. This classification is done on a year-by-year basis. However, Ke and Ramalingegowda (2005) find that the classification remains mostly unchanged over time.
Regression model
To examine the impact of outside block-holders' impact on earnings management, we investigate two different scenarios. First, the income-increasing earnings management scenario using positive discretionary accounting accruals as the proxy (where DAC >0). Second, the income-decreasing earnings management scenario using negative discretionary accounting accruals as the proxy (DAC <0). The regression model is:
Where, for firm i in year t, DAC = discretionary accruals estimated from Eq.(3); OUT is percentage of shares held by all outside block-holders, obtained from Gompers's block-holder database at WRDS; SIZE is measured as the log of market value of equity (data#25*data#199); RISK is market model beta using daily returns calculated for each fiscal year; LEV is the ratio of total debt over total assets (data#9+data#34)/data#6; CFO is cash flow from operations (data#308).
Since there are two competing views regarding the relationship between outside block-holders and earnings management as mentioned in section 2.2, the effect of outside block-holders on earnings management depends on which of the two conflicting factors dominates; we do not have any prediction for the sign of β1.
To examine how the earnings management is affected by institutional investors classified by different investment behavior, we employ the following regression: 
Where, for firm i in year t, TRA is shares owned by transient institutional investors divided by shares outstanding; DED is shares owned by dedicated institutional investors divided by shares outstanding; QIX is shares owned by quasi-indexing institutional investors divided by shares outstanding; and the rest of variables are defined in Eq. (4).
Given that transient institutional investors focus on short-term performance
and place intense pressure on managers to report favorable financial performance, we hypothesize that transient institutional investors' ownership is positively related to the magnitude of discretionary accruals in the income-increasing scenario. i.e. when DAC >0, we hypothesize that the sign of β1 is positive. The higher the transient institutional ownership, the more likely the presence of income-increasing earnings management.
Meanwhile, dedicated institutional investors would play the role to attenuate transient institutional investors' impact, so the predicted sign of β2 is negative. From another point of view, due to the long investment horizon of dedicated institutional investors, they want firm managers to focus on long-term profitability rather than be pre-occupied with managing earnings on a year-by-year basis. They would discourage managers from using discretionary accruals to engage in income-increasing earnings management due to the intense pressure from transient institutional investors. In this sense, the predicted sign of β2 is also negative.
As for the income-decreasing scenario (DAC <0), since transient institutional investors are in favor of better financial performance, they want less income-decreasing discretionary accruals, i.e. less negative DAC. Therefore, when DAC <0, we hypothesize that the sign of β1 is positive. For the sign of β2, there are two competing forces to mitigate transient institutional investors' impact. β2 should have the opposite predicted sign of β1, so β2 is negative. However, the monitoring role of dedicated institutional investors follows that the sign of β2 should be positive, i.e. discourage managers from engaging in income-decreasing earnings manipulation.
Hence, we do not predict the sign of β2 in the income-decreasing scenario when DAC <0. Quasi-indexing investors use buy-and-hold strategies and prior literature has conflicting predictions about their incentives as monitors, hence, we do not have any prediction for the coefficient on QIX.
Sample selection
As mentioned in section 1, Gomper's block-holders database, which consists of firms' observations during the period 1996-2001, is used for data. We focus on active 
TAC i,,t = β 0 / T.A. i,t-1 + β 1 •(Δ REV i,t -ΔAR i,t, )/T.A. i,t-1 + β 2 • PPE i,,t /T.A. i,t-1 + ε i,,t (3)
The above coefficients are applied to the block-holders sample to calculate the discretionary accruals for the firm-year observations with required data from both
Compustat and Gomper's Block-holders databases. The final sample consists of 3,141 firm-year observations. For those 3,141 firm-year observations, the institutional ownership data on the CDA spectrum, which contains the institutional ownership data from the SEC's Form 13(f) will be used. Panel B of Table 2 may resort to using income-increasing discretionary accruals to satisfy these investors.
Empirical Results
Main results
As for the association between DAC and DED, the correlation is not significant.
In fact, when DAC >0, the coefficient on DED is negative, implying (effect is non significant) that dedicated institutional investors try to keep management away from using income-increasing earnings management. When DAC <0, the coefficient on DED is negative. This indicates that dedicated institutional investors are trying to mitigate the impact of transient institutional investors. In both scenarios, the coefficients on DED have the opposite sign when compared to coefficients on TRA.
Surprisingly, the coefficients on QIX always have the same sign as those on DED,
suggesting that quasi-indexing institutional investors function in a similar way as dedicated institutional investors. In sum, due to the different investment horizons, we may not treat institutional investors as a homogeneous group.
Additional tests
Granger causality test
There may be an alternative explanation for the positive (negative) association between transient (dedicated) institutional ownership and discretionary accruals.
Transient (dedicated) institutional investors could choose to invest in firms with
higher (lower) income-increasing earnings management. To address this issue, we follow Ajinkya et al. (2005) and conduct a Granger causality test. Specifically, we add lagged discretionary accruals as an independent variable to Eq. (5). The Granger causality test eliminates the impact of prior earnings management on current institutional ownership, and establishes a causal direction from current institutional ownership to future earnings management. Table 5 shows regression results with lagged discretionary accruals. The estimated coefficients on TRA remain significantly positive as expected when DAC >0. This evidence is consistent with the notion that transient institutional investors exert pressure on managers to engage in income-increasing earnings management after controlling for lagged discretionary accruals. When DAC <0, the coefficient on TRA still has a positive sign, although not significant. As for the relationship between dedicated institutional investors and earnings management, there is very weak evidence showing that there is "monitoring effect" of institutional investors.
Hence, it is difficult to define the causal direction between dedicated institutional ownership and earnings management.
Results examined by dummy variables
Following Chung et al. (2002) , dummy variables were created for the institutional share ownership (TRA, DED, QIX) to further examine the results. Specifically, a dummy variable takes on a value of unity if institutional share ownership for the firm is higher than the cross-sectional top quartile in the year. The results are presented in Table 6 . As expected, Table 6 mimics the main results presented in Table 4 . The coefficients on dummy variables, TRA_D, DED_D, QIX_D, all have the same signs, when compared to those on TRA, DED, and QIX, the actual ownership percentages.
Meanwhile, the significance remains unchanged, i.e. in both scenarios, DAC >0 and DAC<0, ownership by transient institutional investors is significantly positively correlated with discretionary accruals, and ownership by dedicated institutional investors are negatively correlated with discretionary accruals in both scenarios, although not significant.
Conclusions
This paper first examines outside block-holders' impact on earnings management using discretionary accounting accruals as the measure of earnings and discretionary accounting accruals. Therefore, due to the differing natures of outside block-holders (e.g.: institutional investors), we may not treat them as a homogeneous group. Variables are defined as follows: DAC = Discretionary Accruals = Differences between actual total accruals and the fitted values of the modified Jones model. OUT = percentage of shares held by all outside block-holders, obtained from Gompers's block-holder database at WRDS. SIZE = the log of market value of equity (data#25*data#199). RISK = market model beta using daily returns calculated for each fiscal year. LEV = the ratio of total debt over total assets (data#9+data#34)/data#6 CFO = cash flow from operations (data#308). TRA = shares owned by transient institutional investors divided by shares outstanding. DED = shares owned by dedicated institutional investors divided by shares outstanding. QIX = shares owned by quasi-indexing institutional investors divided by shares outstanding. 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
Variables are defined as follows: DAC = Discretionary Accruals = Differences between actual total accruals and the fitted values of the modified Jones model. OUT = percentage of shares held by all outside block-holders, obtained from Gompers's block-holder database at WRDS. SIZE = the log of market value of equity (data#25*data#199). RISK = market model beta using daily returns calculated for each fiscal year. LEV is the ratio of total debt over total assets (data#9+data#34)/data#6 CFO is cash flow from operations (data#308). Variables are defined as follows: DAC = Discretionary Accruals = Differences between actual total accruals and the fitted values of the modified Jones model. TRA = shares owned by transient institutional investors divided by shares outstanding. DED = shares owned by dedicated institutional investors divided by shares outstanding. QIX = shares owned by quasi-indexing investors divided by shares outstanding. SIZE = the log of market value of equity (data#25*data#199). RISK = market model beta using daily returns calculated for each fiscal year. LEV is the ratio of total debt over total assets (data#9+data#34)/data#6 ROA is the ratio of net income plus interest expense over average total assets (data#172+data#15)/average data#6 CFO is cash flow from operations (data#308). DAC = Discretionary Accruals = Differences between actual total accruals and the fitted values of the modified Jones model. Lag_DAC = Lagged discretionary accruals TRA = shares owned by transient institutional investors divided by shares outstanding. DED = shares owned by dedicated institutional investors divided by shares outstanding. QIX = shares owned by quasi-indexing investors divided by shares outstanding. SIZE = the log of market value of equity (data#25*data#199). RISK = market model beta using daily returns calculated for each fiscal year. LEV is the ratio of total debt over total assets (data#9+data#34)/data#6 ROA is the ratio of net income plus interest expense over average total assets (data#172+data#15)/average data#6 CFO is cash flow from operations (data#308). Variables are defined as follows: DAC = Discretionary Accruals = Differences between actual total accruals and the fitted values of the modified Jones model. TRA_D = dummy variable equal to one if transient institutional ownership is higher than the top quartile in a year DED_D = dummy variable equal to one if dedicated institutional ownership is higher than the top quartile in a year QIX_D = dummy variable equal to one if quasi-indexing institutional ownership is higher than the top quartile in a year SIZE = the log of market value of equity (data#25*data#199). RISK = market model beta using daily returns calculated for each fiscal year. LEV is the ratio of total debt over total assets (data#9+data#34)/data#6 ROA is the ratio of net income plus interest expense over average total assets (data#172+data#15)/average data#6 CFO is cash flow from operations (data#308).
